Abstract
Introduction
Mitigating climate change entails reshaping the energy sector, accelerating technological innovation, and raising public awareness. The task also requires substantial political capital to implement long-term mitigation strategies. In many Western democracies, political support is built on a decision-making process in which widening public participation is assumed to be desirable or even non-negotiable (O'Riordan and Jäger 1996; OECD 2002; Van Tatenhove and Leroy 2003; Few et al. 2007; Baker 2013; DevineWright 2014) . Western modes of environmental governance are by no means identical but generally entail a degree of recognition that central government should cede power to sub-national tiers of government and work in partnership with non-governmental actors (WECD 1987; Mol 1996; Seyfang and Haxeltine 2012; Bäckstrand and Kylsäter 2014) . Taken in the round they constitute an orthodox dominant policy template adopted by many states (Hajer 2010; Wanner 2015) .
As the Figure below indicates, China's renewable energy industry grew at unprecedented speed and surpassed previously leading countries (Bradsher 2010; REN21 2015: 20) . The approach China settled upon after some trial and error, however, is driven by top-down command and control measures (Schreurs 2011) . This makes China an important outlier and potential alternative pole of influence in the context of global environmental politics.
Insert Figure about here
This article explores how China developed its relatively unorthodox model for swiftly diffusing non-hydro renewable energy. Next we posit our definitions and conceptualisation, including a brief description of the sustainable development ideal type, the national modes of governance that it informs, as well as the broad principles of the developmental state model. Following that we examine the application of the developmental state model in China i .
Finally we discuss how the Chinese model provides an attractive alternative for authoritarian states.
Definitions and Conceptualisation
Our analysis recognises that the modes of governance that emerged in the Chinese renewables sector were contingent on context and circumstance.
The Europeanisation literature demonstrates that institutional consolidation and change is non-linear (Radaelli 2005) and marked by a 'complex causality' (Saurugger 2006) . From a different theoretical tradition but also focusing on European governance, Jessop's 'strategic-relational' approach stresses the dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship between 'modes' and 'objects' of governance (Jessop 2005 ). As we shall see, in developing its renewables sector Chinese policy makers rejected established Western modes of environmental governance -although specific practices were adapted where necessary. But neither did China revert to its default pattern of decentralised governance but rather we see the emergence of a 'definite mode' of governance (Jessop 1997) appropriate to the specificities of renewables sector in China and the political-economic role it plays.
China's adoption of a developmental state strategy was no foregone conclusion. Yeh and Lewis (2004) argue that China originally pursued a more market-oriented path but modified it because of internal and external Industries' whilst gradually liberalising relatively small and medium-sized state owned enterprises (Pearson 2015) . wider welfare needs (Öniş 1991: 113; Johnson 2012) .
It is easy to see why developmental states tend to emerge within authoritarian regimes. Such regimes allow coordination to take place and, in turn, the successful modernisation of the economy maintains political stability and boosts system legitimacy. Chalmers Johnson (1987) (Öniş 1991: 118) .
The Developmental State in the Chinese context: a Chinese alternative?
The logic of the developmental state is apparent in the Chinese strategy of catch up within the renewables sector, with concerted attempts to transfer and adapt the best available foreign technology, whilst actively protecting China's domestic industry (Pearson 2005) . Governance of the sector remains firmly in the hands of the state, with the majority of energy producers and grid networks dominated by state-owned enterprises (Andrews-Speed 2012;
Pearson 2015), albeit with an increasing number of local private sector actors involved in wind turbine and photovoltaic technologies.
The domestic sector was incentivised by localised protection measures. 
Building an internationally competitive renewables sector from the top down
The early stages of China's development policy were built on carbon energy, and in particular its enormous coal reserves, with huge negative environmental impacts (Liu and Diamond 2005; Shapiro 2012 relationship between 'modes' and 'objects' of governance (Jessop 2005) .
The defining feature of China's renewables governance is the degree to which the main parameters, including how tariffs are set, the degree to which local government can adapt central government policy, etc., are determined by the NDRC. Consistent with the developmental paradigm, the NDRC has considerable operational autonomy, framing the renewables sector as a 'strategic' modern Pillar Industry, levering corporate networks, and rapidly growing China's installed capacity of renewable energy, as well as overseeing the expansion of the global market share in equipment manufacturing. The sector has been guided by a centralised, and professionalised leadership with the goal of upgrading the sector in order to catch up with and eventually overtake advanced Western states. Such a strategy was ultimately driven by the imperative of state building rather than environmental protection. But in doing so it has nevertheless overseen the expansion of the Chinese renewables industry from a standing start to world-class status.
Conclusions
This article shows how the rapid expansion of the renewables sector in China and the associated scaling-up process have not followed the sustainable development paradigm that we see in different forms in the West, characterised by varying degrees of participatory governance, decentralisation, and the inclusion of societal actors.
On the contrary, this study demonstrates that the expansion of renewable energy in China was characterised by the enhancement of central steering capacity, consistent with the developmental state paradigm. In the Chinese model, neither market efficiency nor increasing societal participation was a priority for restructuring the energy market. Instead, central government securitised the sector through re-centralisation and re-intervention, giving priority to political stability through its lead agency, the NDRC. xxii For example, the development of nuclear power in China began early in the 1950s, and the industry was dominated by three state-owned enterprises: China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group Co., Ltd., China National Nuclear Corporation and China Power Investment Corporation. As with the renewables sector, the state was reluctant to open up the sector to foreign actors, and the principle of endogenous technology development was stressed as well as the attempt to facilitate technology transfer from American and French producers (OECD 2012: 116) . However, unlike the renewables sector, there was no centralised government apparatus developing coherent policies for the sector (Xu 2010: 68) and no set of unified standards for nuclear safety and industrial technology and the local industry still remains relatively backward (Liu 2013: 106) . In addition, within the field of climate technology, there is a recognition that the process of catch-up is facing difficulties. As the Ministry of Technology's Twelve Five Year Special Guidelines of Electric Vehicle Technology Development, published in 2012, put it: At present, China's electric vehicle development has entered a critical period. We are facing major development opportunities, and we are also facing serious challenges. There are still many problems to be solved in the development of electric vehicles; for example, our core technology is not competitive, corporation is reluctant to invest, and the potential of government coordinative and planning capacity has not been fully released (Ministry of Technology 2012).
